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In modern society, massive and ever-increasing quantities of data are being 
generated every day.  Therefore, potential parties are under great pressure to 
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spend extraordinary resources to store and maintain data that may be relevant in 
potential litigation.  In light of the inconsistent case law among the federal circuit 
courts’ imposition of sanctions for a loss of electronically stored information 
(hereinafter “ESI”), and in order to reduce the overwhelming economic burden 
for prospective litigants in their efforts to over-preserve potentially relevant ESI 
out of fear of sanctions, the new Rule 37(e) was adopted through the 2015 
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which became effective as 
of December 1, 2015.1 
This Article examines whether the new Rule 37(e) has successfully achieved 
one of its primary goals, which is establishing a uniformity in federal case law 
on imposition of sanctions for the loss of ESI.2  In particular, this Article limits 
its examination to the courts’ imposition of the more severe sanctions available 
under Rule 37(e)(2).  In doing so, Part I introduces the new Rule 37(e), as well 
as its intended goals, and Part II discusses the significantly inconsistent federal 
case law that developed post-2015 amendments with respect to courts’ 
conclusions on whether to impose severe sanctions after applying the new Rule 
37(e)(2).  In particular, the lack of a consistent standard applied by the courts in 
determination of spoliators’ “intent to deprive” under Rule 37(e)(2), and the 
unclear role that the courts’ inherent authority plays in such determinations, are 
discussed in detail through case analyses.  Then, in Part III, the authors propose 
establishing and consistently applying a clear, stringent “intent to deprive 
culpability” standard, which requires a heightened showing of an intentional 
action taken by the spoliator to destroy the relevant ESI, and supporting evidence 
shedding light on the spoliator’s motivation to deprive another party of the use 
of the evidence.  This standard would promote uniformity in case law on 
imposition of severe sanctions under Rule 37(e)(2).  Part IV contains concluding 
remarks. 
I.  THE NEW RULE 37(E), ADOPTED BY THE 2015 AMENDMENTS, AND ITS 
INTENDED GOALS 
“Spoliation is the destruction or significant alteration of evidence, or the 
failure to preserve property for another’s use as evidence in pending or 
reasonably foreseeable litigation.”3  The purposes underlying spoliation 
sanctions have been to “deter parties from engaging in spoliation, [to] place the 
risk of an erroneous judgment on the party who wrongfully created the risk, and 
                                                 
 1. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e). 
 2. Rep. to Standing Comm., Advisory Comm. on Civ. Rules 35 (May 2, 2014) (“Two goals 
have inspired [new Rule 37(e)] work.  One has been to establish greater uniformity in the ways in 
which federal courts respond to a loss of ESI . . . .  The other goal has been to relieve the pressures 
that have led many potential litigants to engage in what they describe as massive and costly over-
preservation.”). 
 3. West v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 167 F.3d 776, 779 (2d Cir. 1999). 
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[to] restore the ‘prejudiced party to the same position [it] would have been in 
absent the wrongful destruction of evidence by the [spoliator] party.’”4 
Before any court applies Rule 37(e), “Failure to Preserve Electronically 
Stored Information,” the following must be satisfied: 1) the ESI “that should 
have been preserved in the anticipation or conduct of litigation is lost [2)] 
because a party failed to take reasonable steps to preserve it, and [3)] it cannot 
be restored or replaced through additional discovery.”5  If all three elements are 
satisfied, then the court may determine whether sanctions pursuant to Rule 
37(e)(1) and/or 37(e)(2) apply.6  The Rule makes clear that sanctioning measures 
should be “no greater than necessary[,]” and therefore, “only upon [a] finding 
[of] intent to deprive” are the more severe sanctions—such as an adverse 
inference that either the court or the jury may “presume the lost information was 
unfavorable to the [spoliator] party” or dismissal of the case—allowed under 
Rule 37(e)(2).7 
Prior to the 2015 amendments, there was a split of authority among the circuit 
courts on imposition of severe sanctions for spoliation.  The Second Circuit 
granted adverse inference jury instructions based on the spoliator’s negligence 
or gross negligence, while others, such as the Tenth Circuit, required a bad faith 
showing before granting adverse inference instructions.8  Therefore, the 
amendments were intended to eliminate the circuit split and thereby promote 
uniformity of case law among the federal courts.9  Another goal that the 
amendments sought to achieve was to relieve the excessive burden on potential 
litigants from over-preservation of documents and records out of fear of 
                                                 
 4. Id. at 779 (quoting Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 126 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 5. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e). 
 6. Id.  The following is the full text of the new Rule 37(e): 
FAILURE TO PRESERVE ELECTRONICALLY STORED INFORMATION.  If electronically 
stored information that should have been preserved in the anticipation or conduct of 
litigation is lost because a party failed to take reasonable steps to preserve it, and it cannot 
be restored or replaced through additional discovery, the court: 
 (1) upon finding prejudice to another party from loss of the information, may order 
measures no greater than necessary to cure the prejudice; or 
 (2) only upon finding that the party acted with the intent to deprive another party of 
the information’s use in the litigation may: 
   (A) presume that the lost information was unfavorable to the party; 
(B) instruct the jury that it may or must presume the information was 
unfavorable to the party; or 
   (C) dismiss the action or enter a default judgment. 
Id. 
 7. Id. at (e)(1)–(2). 
 8. Compare Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 
2002) with Aramburu v. Boeing Co., 112 F.3d 1398, 1407 (10th Cir. 1997). 
 9. Rep. to Standing Comm., Advisory Comm. on Civ. Rules 42 (May 2, 2014) (“A primary 
purpose of [the proposed 37(e)(2)] is to eliminate the circuit split on when a court may give an 
adverse inference jury instruction for the loss of ESI.”). 
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spoliation sanctions.10  Clear interpretations of and consistent applications of the 
new Rule 37(e) by the courts would enhance the predictability of case outcomes 
and promote uniformity in resulting case law.  Consequently, litigants and 
potential parties may be able to have appropriate expectations regarding 
sanctionable spoliation conduct, as well as their duties to preserve relevant ESI. 
According to the Advisory Committee Notes (hereinafter “Committee 
Notes”) on the new Rule 37(e), because the Rule “authorizes and specifies 
measures a court may employ if information that should have been preserved is 
lost,” the Rule “forecloses” courts’ “reliance on inherent authority or state law 
to determine when certain measures should be used.”11  An intention to 
“foreclose [courts’] reliance on inherent authority or state law[,]” and adhere 
instead to the Rule in reaching their decisions to impose sanctions, is consistent 
with the goal of promoting uniformity of case law on courts’ imposition of 
sanctions for spoliation.12 
However, some commentators have been critical of the weight that has been 
given to the Committee Notes, as they are explanations to aid in interpretation 
of the Rule(s), and not part of the text of the Rule(s).  Therefore, some critics 
have argued that the focus should be limited to the actual text of the Rule(s), as 
only those have been authoritatively adopted and not the explanatory comments 
on the Rule(s).13  It is further contended that because the text of Rule 37(e) does 
not refer to courts’ inherent power or authority at all, it “may be invoked to fill 
any remaining interstices where the statute or rule is not ‘up to the task,’” and 
moreover, it “may be exercised even where it conflicts with a statute or rule, [if] 
necessary to protect a core judicial function.”14  This contention is in direct 
conflict with the Committee Notes on Rule 37(e). 
Lastly, Rule 37(e)(2) aims to narrow the requisite level of culpability based 
on which of the more severe sanctions, like adverse inferences, may be 
granted.15  However, the problem is that the “intent to deprive” standard in Rule 
37(e)(2) is ambiguous because there is no clear definition or explanation as to 
what constitutes or satisfies such culpability.  Additionally, many courts still rely 
on findings of bad faith, and/or lack thereof, without any supporting reasons or 
authority for this reliance, and despite the fact that bad faith does not appear 
anywhere in the text of Rule 37.16  Furthermore, courts have not elaborated on 
                                                 
 10. See supra note 2. 
 11. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e) advisory committee’s note to 2015 Amendment. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Hon. James C. Francis IV & Eric P. Mandel, Limits on Limiting Inherent Authority: Rule 
37(e) and the Power to Sanction, 17 SEDONA CONF. J. 613, 644–45 (2016). 
 14. Id. at 643. 
 15. Rep. to Standing Comm., Advisory Comm. on Civ. Rules 42 (May 2, 2014) (“Subdivision 
(e)(2) resolves the circuit split by permitting adverse inference instructions only on a finding that 
the party ‘acted with the intent to deprive another party of the information’s use in the litigation.’  
This intent requirement is akin to bad faith, but is defined even more precisely.”). 
 16. See discussion infra Section II.B. 
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the significance of bad faith findings (or lack thereof) in determinations of the 
spoliator’s intent to deprive another party of the use of the evidence in litigation.  
Therefore, Part II will examine in detail the inconsistent case law established by 
the federal courts in their application of Rule 37(e)(2). 
II.  THE INCONSISTENT FEDERAL CASE LAW ESTABLISHED THROUGH COURTS’ 
APPLICATION OF THE NEW RULE 37(E)(2) 
A.  The Lack of a Consistent Standard Applied by the Courts in a Finding of 
“Intent to Deprive” Under Rule 37(e)(2) 
An examination of case law produced by courts’ application of the new Rule 
37(e) demonstrates that they have established neither a clear standard nor a 
consistent way of determining the spoliators’ “intent to deprive” under Rule 
37(e)(2).  Commentators note that, while the culpability required under Rule 
37(e)(2) is “akin to bad faith, but is defined even more precisely,”17 it remains 
unclear whether a showing of recklessness is sufficient to satisfy this 
requirement.18  For instance, within the state of New York alone, case law has 
not revealed consistent direction on courts’ imposition of sanctions for spoliation 
because courts have applied different standards to find the spoliator’s intent to 
deprive another party of the use of the evidence.19  Some courts have adhered to 
a relatively narrow standard that if a party had failed to take reasonable steps to 
preserve relevant ESI despite its duty to do so, then the court would find that the 
party had an intent to deprive another party of such ESI, either from direct or 
circumstantial evidence.20  Applying this narrow standard, some courts have 
held “a party’s conscious dereliction of a known duty to preserve electronic data 
is both necessary and sufficient to find that the party ‘acted with the intent to 
deprive another party of the information’s use.’”21  Similarly, courts have found 
                                                 
 17. Rep. to Standing Comm., Advisory Comm. on Civ. Rules 42 (May 2, 2014) (“[A]dverse 
inference instructions . . . historically have been based on a logical conclusion—when a party 
destroys evidence for the purpose of preventing another party from using it in litigation, one 
reasonably can infer that the evidence was unfavorable to the destroying party.”). 
 18. Robert Keeling, Sometimes, Old Rules Know Best: Returning to Common Law 
Conceptions of the Duty to Preserve in the Digital Information Age, 67 CATH. U. L. REV. 67, 100–
01 (2018) (“In articulating this [intent to deprive] standard, the Advisory Committee believed the 
requirement of ‘bad faith’ adopted in numerous circuits to be ‘too restrictive.’  The Committee also 
rejected the Second Circuit’s position that ‘negligence’ or ‘gross negligence’ was enough for severe 
sanctions.  Between the two standards, the Advisory Committee’s notes leave some ambiguity as 
to what will count as enough.  For example, despite numerous comments questioning whether 
recklessness would be sufficient under the rule, the Committee remained silent.”). 
 19. See, e.g., Ungar v. City of New York, 329 F.R.D. 8 (E.D.N.Y. 2018); Moody v. CSX 
Transp., Inc., 271 F. Supp. 3d 410 (W.D.N.Y. 2017); CAT3, LLC v. Black Lineage, Inc., 164 F. 
Supp. 3d 488 (S.D.N.Y. 2016); Karsch v. Blink Health Ltd., No. 17-CV-3880 (VM) (BCM), 2019 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106971 (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 20, 2019); Hsueh v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Fin. Servs., No. 
15 Civ. 3401, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49568, (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2017). 
 20. Ungar v. City of New York, 329 F.R.D. 8, 13 (E.D.N.Y. 2018). 
 21. Id. (emphasis added). 
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it irrelevant “[w]hether the spoliator affirmatively destroy[ed] the data or 
passively allow[ed] it to be lost” in determining whether the spoliator had an 
intent to deprive under Rule 37(e)(2).22  The court applied this narrow and 
specific culpability standard in Moody v. CSX Transportation, Inc., where the 
defendant knew of the duty to preserve relevant ESI and still allowed “the 
original data on the event recorder to be overwritten, and destroyed or recycled 
[the crashed] laptop” that likely contained relevant information.23  The court 
inferred that defendants had an intent to deprive because, in the period of four 
years, they failed to confirm whether “the data had been preserved in another 
repository.”24  This holding overreaches because, while one party acting 
unreasonably generally amounts to negligence or gross negligence, the Moody 
court inferred from the defendants’ unreasonableness an intent to deprive 
another party of the use of the evidence; consequently, the court held that an 
                                                 
 22. Id.  See also Moody v. CSX Transp., Inc., 271 F. Supp. 3d 410, 428–29 (W.D.N.Y. 2017) 
(“[D]efendants allowed the original data on the event recorder to be overwritten and destroyed 
without ensuring that it had been appropriately preserved.  Just as it would be unreasonable for a 
party preserving a paper file to copy it blindly, put it in a drawer without ever looking at it, and 
then destroy the original, so too was it unreasonable for defendants to upload the event recorder 
data to the Vault and not even look at the files to confirm that the appropriate data had been 
uploaded and was accessible.  This failure is especially remarkable in view of the important and 
irreplaceable nature of the data at issue.”).  As a result, the court found an intent to deprive pursuant 
to Rule 37(e)(2).  Id. at 429. 
 23. Moody, 271 F. Supp. 3d at 422–23, 431. 
 24. Id. at 431.  The Moody court, in reaching its conclusion that an adverse inference was 
proper, cited to Alabama Aircraft Industries, Inc. v. Boeing Co., in which a northern Alabama 
district court said that the spoliator party’s “unexplained, blatantly irresponsible behavior [led] the 
court to conclude that [the defendant] acted with the intent to deprive [another party] of the use of 
[the evidence].”  Id.; Ala. Aircraft Indus., Inc. v. Boeing Co., 319 F.R.D. 730, 746 (N.D. Ala. 2017).  
But in that case, the court inferred an intent to deprive from circumstantial evidence of bad faith of 
the spoliator, noting that Rule 37(e)(2) intent to deprive is “harmonious with the ‘bad-faith’ 
standard previously established by the Eleventh Circuit” on spoliation.  Ala. Aircraft Indus., Inc., 
319 F.R.D. at 746 (citing Living Color Enters. Inc. v. Essent Healthcare, Inc., No. 14-cv-62216-
MARRA/MATTHEWMAN, 2016 U.S Dist. LEXIS, at *6 (S.D. Fla. 2010)).  In particular, because 
the ESI at issue had been intentionally destroyed by an affirmative act without credible justification, 
which is a deviation from the standard protocol, the court considered this a “type of unexplained, 
blatantly irresponsible behavior” and held that it was sufficient to conclude an intent to deprive the 
other party from using such information.  Id.  In addition, and of critical importance, there had been 
an agreement between the parties to extract the proprietary information at issue and to deliver it to 
the law department for proper preservation, but the spoliator party had violated this agreement by 
deliberately deleting such information without just explanations.  Id.  Based on this, the plaintiff 
alleged that the spoliator party used that proprietary information in revising its bid to reduce the 
price by $15 million without justification for the reduction.  Id. at 744.  The court likely found bad 
faith of the spoliator in Alabama Aircraft Industries, Inc. especially in light of this particular fact 
and consequently concluded that an adverse inference jury instruction was proper.  Id. at 446.  In 
other words, this analysis goes beyond the narrow standard of finding an intent to deprive based on 
the party’s mere failure to take reasonable steps to preserve relevant ESI.  However, the court in 
Moody did not conduct an analysis reaching beyond the narrow standard.  Moody, 271 F. Supp. 3d 
at 431. 
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adverse inference instruction was warranted under Rule 37(e)(2).25  But the 
Committee Notes make clear that Rule 37(e)(2) rejects the issuance of adverse 
inference instructions based on a finding of negligence or gross negligence by 
explicitly rejecting cases such as Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge 
Financial Corp.,26 decided by the Second Circuit.27  Thus, the court’s inference 
of the intent to deprive another party of the evidence, based solely on the party’s 
failure to reasonably preserve the relevant ESI, raises serious questions as to the 
requirements needed in order to satisfy the “intent to deprive” culpability of Rule 
37(e)(2).  Where a court infers that the spoliator party had an intent to deprive 
another party of the use of the evidence in litigation by “passively allow[ing the 
ESI] to be lost” without an affirmative destruction of the relevant ESI,28 the 
requisite state of mind of the spoliator appears to be closer to that of negligence, 
or at most, gross negligence, which should fall significantly short of an “intent 
to deprive” under Rule 37(e)(2).29 
Similarly, in O’Berry v. Turner, which courts often cite to, a district court in 
Georgia found that the defendants had acted with an intent to deprive the 
plaintiffs of the ESI at issue based on what it determined was the defendants’ 
“irresponsible and shiftless behavior.”30  Consequently, the court issued a 
mandatory adverse jury instruction.31  Because the particular facts of each case 
are important when examining how courts have treated spoliators’ conduct, the 
                                                 
 25. Moody, 271 F. Supp. 3d at 431. 
 26. Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 2002) 
(holding that “a party seeking an adverse inference instruction based on the destruction of [ESI] 
must establish (1) that the party having control over the evidence had an obligation to preserve it at 
the time it was destroyed; (2) that the records were destroyed ‘with a culpable state of mind’; and 
(3) that the destroyed evidence was ‘relevant’ to the party’s claim or defense such that a reasonable 
trier of fact could find that it would support that claim or defense.”) (quoting Byrnie v. Town of 
Cromwell, 243 F.3d 93, 107–12 (2d Cir. 2001)). 
 27. See Rep. to Standing Comm., Advisory Comm. on Civ. Rules 39 (May 2, 2014). 
 28. Ungar v. City of New York, 329 F.R.D. 8, 13 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (“Whether the spoliator 
affirmatively destroys the data, or passively allows it to be lost, is irrelevant; it is the spoliator’s 
state of mind that logically supports the adverse inference.”). 
 29. The Committee Notes clearly state 
that a party’s intentional loss or destruction of evidence to prevent its use in litigation 
gives rise to a reasonable inference that the evidence was unfavorable to the party 
responsible for loss or destruction of the evidence.  Negligent or even grossly negligent 
behavior does not logically support that inference.  Information lost through negligence 
may have been favorable to either party, including the party that lost it, and inferring that 
it was unfavorable to that party may tip the balance at trial in ways the lost information 
never would have.  The better rule for the negligent or grossly negligent loss of 
electronically stored information is to preserve a broad range of measures to cure 
prejudice caused by its loss, but to limit the most severe measures to instances of 
intentional loss or destruction. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e)(2) advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment. 
 30. O’Berry v. Turner, 7:15-CV-00075-HL, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55714, at *13 (M.D. Ga. 
Apr. 27, 2016). 
 31. Id. 
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following is a factual summary.  In O’Berry, the defendant employee, who was 
the former loss control manager of the defendant company, testified that 
when an accident occurred, his job was to print copies of the driver’s 
log and any information collected on PeopleNet . . . .  These documents 
were then kept in a manila folder, along with any additional documents 
related to the incident.  Printing the driver’s log and PeopleNet data 
did not require [the employee] to download any documents to his 
computer’s storage—this information was printed straight from a 
website.32 
He testified further that he was “not aware of any [company] policies that 
govern the collection process or storage of these accident files—it was simply a 
part of his job to print and store a single paper copy of these documents.”33 
With this particular accident on June 21, 2013, involving defendant Turner, 
the loss control manager printed Defendant Turner’s driver log and PeopleNet 
data, placing it into a folder on his desk.34  It stayed there until he “receive[d] 
additional documentation, including the accident report and any photographs 
taken at the scene.  After a period of time, the folder was moved to a cabinet in 
his office, where it had been filed alongside manila folders documenting other 
incidents.”35  When the loss control manager received the spoliation letter of 
August 18, 2013, he “took no additional action to preserve . . . the 
information.”36  In preparation for an office move in November 2013, the loss 
control manager packed the contents of his office.37  He soon took medical leave 
however, and the maintenance crew moved “the boxes containing the contents 
of his office to his new office . . . .”38  After returning in January 2014, the loss 
control manager “unloaded the boxes, placing the manila folders into filing 
cabinets in his new office.”39  When, in January 2016, he “received a request for 
the manila folder containing information about [Turner’s accident, he] became 
aware that he no longer had the manila folder.  He then contacted PeopleNet to 
retrieve the lost information; however, PeopleNet had already deleted the 
relevant data pursuant to their document retention policy.”40 
The O’Berry court noted that “[a]t no point between August 2013 and January 
2016 did [the loss control manager] receive any correspondence inquiring about 
or requesting information regarding this [particular] accident.”41  While the loss 
control manager testified that while “he had done everything in his power to 
                                                 
 32. Id. at *5–6. 
 33. Id. at *5. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at *5–6. 
 37. Id. at *6. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
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preserve the evidence [, he had] no explanation as to why the [relevant] manila 
folder [was] missing.”42  The court applied Rule 37(e) to this case and held that 
it was “simply irresponsible to print a single paper copy of the information which 
one has a duty to preserve . . . .  At the very least, [the loss control manager] 
should have made additional efforts to ensure the preservation of these materials 
once the spoliation letter was received on August 18, 2013.”43  Because the 
defendant company “had no written policy on the proper procedure for 
preserving information that may be relevant in foreseeable litigation, at least not 
that [the loss control manager] was aware [of,]” the court held that the defendant 
company had “failed to ensure that these documents were maintained while in 
[its] sole possession.”44 
The court also noted that no one from the defendant company or defense 
counsel had contacted the loss control manager “about these documents or 
requested copies of documents until January 2016, despite numerous requests” 
from the plaintiff’s counsel.45  Consequently, the court held that, considering all 
the facts, “the loss of the at-issue ESI was beyond the result of mere negligence.  
Such “irresponsible and shiftless behavior” can only lead to one conclusion—
that [the defendant company] acted with the intent to deprive [the plaintiff] of 
the use of [such] information at trial.”46  As a result, the court held that a 
mandatory adverse inference jury instruction was warranted, charging “the jury 
that it must presume that the lost information” had been unfavorable to the 
defendants.47 
Here, the O’Berry court’s finding of an intent to deprive seems to have been 
overreaching.  It is unreasonable to require the loss control manager to undertake 
                                                 
 42. Id. at *7. 
 43. Id. at *12. 
 44. Id. at *13. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at *14.  This holding of a mandatory adverse inference jury instruction appears to be 
unnecessarily harsh given the facts, especially since the court’s conclusion of finding intent to 
deprive may have been overreaching.  While the decision to impose and choose appropriate 
sanctions are properly within the court’s discretion, a permissive adverse inference jury instruction 
may have been more fitting under the circumstances.  See Borum v. Brentwood Vill., LLC, 332 
F.R.D. 38, 48–49 (D.D.C. 2019) (distinguishing O’Berry because the defendant company’s rather 
weak retention policy did not rise to the level of “irresponsible and shiftless behavior” that the 
O’Berry court found).  In declining to follow O’Berry, the Borum court held that—while it agreed 
the defendant company had “significantly inadequate record-keeping practices” and noted that the 
company “had some data restoration features in place for deleted e-mails, albeit with an 
unreasonably short recovery period[,]” these practices “alone [did] not satisfy the stringent standard 
[of the intent to deprive requirement] of Rule 37(e)(2).”  Id.  It should also be noted that in Borum, 
the defendant company had been late in issuing a litigation hold as well—the plaintiff filed suit on 
August 25, 2016, but the written litigation hold was not issued until May 30, 2018, so “[p]rior to 
this date, employees could delete company emails with only a limited 25-day recovery window[.]”  
Id. at 41, 46 (citations omitted).  The court concluded that it was proper to treat these practices as 
“unreasonable,” but that such practices fell short of manifesting an intent to deprive the other party 
of information in litigation.  Id. at 46, 49. 
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additional steps to ensure that all relevant materials were still well-maintained 
in their respective manila folders and cabinets during an office move and 
absence from work.48  While the absence of an adequate document preservation 
policy and the failure to contact the loss control manager for the ESI at issue, 
especially despite opposing counsel’s numerous requests, may constitute 
negligence—and perhaps even gross negligence—such actions do not 
necessarily indicate that the defendants intended to deprive the other party of the 
information.  Additionally, the record indicated that the loss control manager 
“contacted PeopleNet to retrieve the lost information” once he realized it was 
missing.49  While the court made clear that it considered all the facts in 
concluding that the defendants “acted with an intent to deprive the other party 
of the information,” perhaps the fact that no one reached out to the loss control 
manager regarding the information, especially in spite of numerous requests 
from plaintiffs’ counsel, played a critical role in its conclusion.50  All other 
actions, including the lack of additional efforts to ensure proper preservation of 
relevant ESI, amount to “irresponsible and shiftless behavior,” which is 
generally considered negligent or grossly negligent conduct—falling short of the 
level of culpability required to satisfy Rule 37(e)(2). 
Some courts in New York, as well as other states, have continued to rely on 
finding(s) of whether the spoliator acted in bad faith in their determinations of 
the spoliator(s)’ intent to deprive another party of the evidence, despite the fact 
that the text of the Rule 37(e) does not require a bad-faith finding or even 
mention bad faith.51  For instance, in Resnik v. Coulson, the court found that the 
defendant’s conduct in “‘actively download[ing’ a] data-wiping software” on his 
computer just one day after the seizure of his devices had been ordered was 
intentional in the sense that it was a “purposeful attempt to destroy all evidence 
. . . .”52  The court thus concluded that the defendant had acted with an “intent 
to deprive” the plaintiff of use of the evidence in terms of Rule 37(e)(2).53  The 
court, however, did not go into any further analysis regarding the level of 
                                                 
 48. O’Berry, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55714, at *6. 
 49. Id.  Even assuming the loss control manager took additional steps to preserve the 
information at issue—such as taking the particular manila folder out of the cabinet and separating 
it from all other accident reports—there is still no guarantee that it would have been better preserved 
in the midst of both the office move and his medical leave.  Nonetheless, failure to take additional 
steps to preserve documents should amount to negligence or gross negligence at worst.  Therefore, 
especially since the loss control manager most likely dealt with multiple incidents over a period of 
two to three years, the court’s limitation of adverse inferences to the responsible defendant 
companies, and not against the other defendants, was reasonable.  See id. at *14 (applying the 
adverse jury instruction to specified companies and “not to the other [d]efendants involved in [the] 
lawsuit”). 
 50. Id. at *6. 
 51. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37. 
 52. Resnik v. Coulson, No. 17-CV-676 (PKC) (SMG), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55199, at *11, 
*35–36 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2019). 
 53. Id. at *35–36. 
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culpability beyond the defendant’s affirmative and intentional destruction of 
evidence, but instead found that the destruction had been done in bad faith.54  It 
subsequently held that the defendant had acted “with the intent to deprive [the 
plaintiff] of [the evidence’s] use in litigation[,]” warranting more severe 
sanctions under Rule 37(e)(2).55 
Finally, there has been yet another approach—which seems the most 
appropriate—by which the court requires the existence of a more particular and 
specific intent on behalf of the spoliator: “the intent to actually deprive another 
party of the evidence.”56  Hence, a mere intention “to perform an act that 
destroys [ESI]” is insufficient.57  Accordingly, the court in Karsch v. Blink 
Health Ltd. rejected the defendants’ contention that the intent to deprive should 
be inferred from the fact that the destruction of the server containing the relevant 
ESI took place weeks after the demand letter, and instead held that, while 
“Karsch failed to take reasonable steps to preserve [relevant] ESI” on the server, 
the court could not conclude that “he did so for the specific purpose of gaining 
an advantage in [the] litigation . . . .”58  Moreover, the court noted that the law 
firm’s status itself, without more, did not necessarily lead the court to conclude 
that its failure to preserve the ESI at issue was intentional in terms of Rule 
37(e)(2).59  Consequently, the court held that the law firm’s “actual loss of the 
[devices],” coupled with its efforts to cover-up—including its false 
representations—demonstrated gross negligence but not a specific intent to 
deprive.60  This court’s reasoning—and holding—is significantly different from 
other federal courts in New York, discussed previously, which simply found an 
intent to deprive under Rule 37(e)(2) based on the spoliator party’s failure to 
uphold its duty to reasonably preserve relevant ESI.61 
Therefore, while such a narrow standard can produce more consistent case 
law, and a more specifically defined standard would not require the courts to 
exercise discretion in their findings, it is an inappropriate standard for courts to 
apply in finding an intent to deprive, given that severe sanctions may result.  
Thus, additional factors need to be considered to determine a party’s negligence 
or gross negligence in satisfying the intent to deprive under Rule 37(e)(2), and a 
clear standard should be provided with sufficient details as to the necessary 
                                                 
 54. Id. at *7, *25–30. 
 55. Id. at *19, *35. 
 56. Karsch v. Blink Health Ltd., No. 17-CV-3880 (VM) (BCM), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
106971, at *59 (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 20, 2019).  Compare CAT3, LLC v. Black Lineage, Inc., 164 F. 
Supp. 3d 488, 501 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (drawing a reasonable inference that the plaintiffs “acted with 
the intent to deprive” based only on the intentional spoliation of emails and circumstantial evidence 
supporting the presumed benefit derived by manipulating the emails). 
 57. Karsch, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106971, at *59. 
 58. Id. at *60, *62. 
 59. Id. at *72. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Even case law developed within the same geographical district (i.e., S.D.N.Y.) does not 
present a consistent line of reasoning or conclusions. 
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elements.  Consistent applications of clear standards by the courts would result 
in more predictable and uniform case law. 
B.  The Courts’ Unclear and Inconsistent Reliance on Their Inherent Authority 
to Sanction 
While it may be appropriate and desirable for all courts to follow the 
Committee Notes, and thereby foreclose their reliance on inherent power in 
order to promote uniformity in case law as the court in Borum v. Brentwood 
Village, LLC explicitly did,62 an examination of federal court cases across the 
nation has not revealed such a coherent or uniform finding.  Some courts still 
rely on their inherent authority, concurrent with Rule 37(e), to sanction parties 
for their spoliation of ESI, while other courts insist on finding the spoliators’ bad 
faith before imposing sanctions, albeit without explicitly invoking their inherent 
authority.  All the while, at least one court has specifically rejected applying 
Rule 37(e) when addressing the issue of sanctioning spoliation of ESI.63  The 
following subsections examine some of the notable cases that fall into each of 
these categories. 
1.  Cases in Which Courts have Applied Rule 37(e)(2) as Well as Their 
Inherent Authority to Address the Issue of Imposition of Sanctions for 
Spoliation of ESI 
In CAT3, LLC v. Black Lineage, Inc., the court held that while the new Rule 
37(e) applied regarding the plaintiffs’ intentional alteration of the emails at issue, 
the court could still exercise its inherent authority to remedy spoliation under the 
circumstances, even if the Rule did not apply.64  The court stated that “[a] 
‘particularized showing of bad faith’ is necessary to justify exercising [the 
court’s inherent power,]” and that “[s]poliation designed to deprive an adversary 
of the use of evidence in litigation qualifies as bad faith conduct.”65  In holding 
so, the court discounted the Committee Notes’ advice to “foreclose[] reliance on 
inherent authority” when it analyzed the applicability of its inherent power after 
                                                 
 62. Borum v. Brentwood Vill., LLC, 332 F.R.D. 38, 42, 44 (D.D.C. 2019) (considering 
whether to impose sanctions under both the court’s inherent power and Rule 37(e) and concluding 
that, because “the loss of electronic evidence stored on emails [fell] squarely within the scope of 
Rule 37(e)[,]” it should apply the Rule rather than its inherent power in the case of an employee 
who deleted her emails before leaving her employment about two months prior to the issuance of a 
written litigation hold). 
 63. Hsueh v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Fin. Servs., No. 15 Civ. 3401, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49568, 
at *10–11 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2017). 
 64. CAT3, LLC v. Black Lineage, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 3d 488, 497–501 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) 
(“Thus, sanctions would be available under the court’s inherent authority even if Rule 37(e) did not 
apply.”). 
 65. Id. at 501.  While the court held that it was reasonable to infer from the intentional 
spoliation of the emails that the intention was to manipulate the digital information for purposes of 
this litigation, and thereby found that the prerequisites of Rule 37(e)(2) were satisfied, it decided 
against imposing the more severe sanctions pursuant to Rule 37(e)(2).  Id. at 502. 
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the court had already found that the Rule was applicable, and each of the 
threshold requirements of Rule 37(e) was satisfied.66  Additionally, in Yoe v. 
Crescent Sock Co., a United States District Court in Tennessee relied on CAT3 
for the proposition that “[s]anction[ing] authority for the loss of ESI may also 
derive from other sections of Rule 37 and possibly from the inherent power of a 
court.”67 
2.  Cases in Which Courts have Relied on Findings of Bad Faith in 
Determining Spoliator’s “Intent to Deprive” Under Rule 37(e)(2) Without 
Invoking Inherent Authority 
As previously mentioned, in Resnik v. Coulson the court found that the 
defendant, who actively downloaded a data-wiping software on his computer 
just one day after the seizure of his devices was ordered, acted intentionally in 
the sense of a “purposeful attempt to destroy all evidence . . . .”68  The court thus 
concluded that the defendant acted with an intent to deprive the plaintiff of use 
of the evidence under Rule 37(e)(2).69  The court, however, confined its analysis 
of the defendant’s culpability to his willful, intentional act in destroying the 
evidence to reach the conclusion that he acted with an intent to deprive the 
plaintiffs of its use in litigation.70  At the same time, the court found that 
spoliation by the defendant had been in bad faith, and therefore the more severe 
sanctions pursuant to Rule 37(e)(2) were warranted.71 
By the same token, other courts have relied on the lack of a spoliator’s bad 
faith to decide against imposing sanctions available under Rule 37(e)(2).  In 
particular, in Virtual Studios, Inc. v. Stanton Carpet Corp., the court found that 
there was no question that the emails at issue had been lost for purposes of Rule 
37(e), and that, if they had been available, it “would be helpful in evaluating the 
merits of the [p]arties’ positions.”72  While the court held that “the loss of emails 
certainly [was] prejudicial” to the non-spoliator party, it “decline[d] to impose 
sanctions under Rule 37(e)(2), because Stanton [had] not shown that Virtual 
Studios acted in bad faith or with intent to deprive Stanton of the use of the 
                                                 
 66. Id. at 497–98, 500 (“The emails are plainly ‘electronically stored information.’  There is 
no dispute that the plaintiffs were obligated to preserve them in connection with this litigation.  As 
discussed above, information was ‘lost’ and cannot adequately be ‘restored or replaced.’  And the 
plaintiffs’ manipulation of the email addresses is not consistent with taking ‘reasonable steps’ to 
preserve the evidence.”). 
 67. Yoe v. Crescent Sock Co., No. 1:15-cv-3-SKL, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 187900, at *21 
(E.D. Tenn. Nov. 14, 2017). 
 68. Resnik v. Coulson, No. 17-CV-676 (PKC) (SMG), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55199, at *11, 
*21 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2019). 
 69. Id. at *21, *27–30. 
 70. Id. at *11. 
 71. Id. at *14. 
 72. Virtual Studios, Inc. v. Stanton Carpet Corp., No. 4:15-CV-0070-HLM, 2016 U.S. LEXIS 
195196, at *31 (N.D. Ga. Jun. 23, 2016). 
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information in this litigation.”73  The court did not elaborate as to why it was 
necessary to undertake a bad faith analysis to reach its conclusion, or articulate 
the grounds for finding a violation of Rule 37(e)(2) with actions taken either in 
bad faith or with an intent to deprive.74  The court provided that “Virtual Studios 
could have taken greater care to preserve the information[,]” but such “evidence 
[only] indicate[d] that Virtual Studios was negligent or careless.”75  
Consequently, as negligence does not rise to the requisite culpability to warrant 
severe sanctions under Rule 37(e)(2), the court declined to impose them.76 
In addition, in Schmalz v. Village of North Riverside, the court noted that 
further evidence was required to find an “intent to deprive” under Rule 
37(e)(2)—in addition to the defendants’ testimony admitting that they had failed 
to preserve the ESI at issue while possessing a duty to preserve—because the 
testimony only rose to the culpability of gross negligence, which falls short of 
an intent to deprive.77  This court also required a showing that spoliation was 
done in bad faith.78  Nonetheless, the court was “disturbed that Defendants 
admit[ed] to failing to take any steps to identify and preserve the text messages 
in question despite having [had] a duty to preserve [them.]”79  Moreover, the 
court found it more troublesome that one of the defendants was a lawyer, who 
should have known about “the significance of a litigation hold letter.”80 
Nevertheless, the court held that “absent additional evidence of deliberate 
intent to deprive Plaintiff of the use of the text messages [the] Defendants’ 
behavior, while certainly constituting gross negligence, does not rise to the level 
of bad faith.”81  After concluding that the plaintiff failed to “present[ ] sufficient 
evidence to make a finding of willfulness or bad faith required to find intent,” 
no adverse inference instruction pursuant to Rule 37(e)(2) was imposed.82  The 
court distinguished other cases in which courts found that spoliators engaged in 
bad faith.83  For instance, the court distinguished this situation from a 
“defendant’s ‘double’ deletion of emails and ‘[instruction to] others to delete 
emails[,]’” as well as from the conduct the O’Berry court considered 
“irresponsible and shiftless.”84  The court further distinguished the defendants’ 
actions from a “deliberate deletion and destruction of evidence and lack of 
                                                 
 73. Id. at *31–32. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at *32. 
 76. Id. at *32–33. 
 77. Schmalz v. Vill. of N. Riverside, No. 13 C 8012, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 216011, at *18 
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 23, 2018). 
 78. Id. at *13. 
 79. Id. at *17–18. 
 80. Id. at *18. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at *18–19. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 14–15.  See also discussion supra Section II.A. 
2021] The "Intent to Deprive" Cuplability Under Rule 37(E)(2) 191 
candor concerning [such] actions [which] constitute[d] bad-faith litigation 
conduct . . . .”85  The Schmalz court made it clear that without these extraordinary 
measures, sanctions under Rule 37(e)(2) would not be imposed.86 
As demonstrated, courts have inconsistently relied on their analyses of bad 
faith of spoliators, or lack thereof, which have long been an integral part of 
courts’ decisions to impose sanctions pursuant to their inherent authority.  
However, these courts have not expressly invoked their inherent power—and 
often have failed to provide reasons for its invocation—or properly discussed 
the significance that such bad faith findings, or lack thereof, have on the courts’ 
ultimate conclusion in finding intent to deprive.  Furthermore, some courts have 
placed bad faith conduct on equal footing with “intent to deprive” conduct by 
applying an either/or standard, making each seem independently sufficient and 
seemingly interchangeable, without any supporting reasons or authority for 
doing so. 
3.  An Odd Case in Which the Court Explicitly Rejected Application of Rule 
37(e) and Instead Relied on its Inherent Power to Sanction the Spoliator’s 
Intentional Destruction of ESI 
In Hsueh v. New York State Department of Financial Services, a United States 
District Court in New York held that an adverse inference instruction was 
appropriate where the plaintiff “admitted at her deposition that she had recorded 
a relevant conversation,” regarding the alleged sexual harassment “but had since 
deleted it.”87  Here, however, the court explicitly rejected application of Rule 
37(e), after accepting the defendant’s argument that “Rule 37(e) applies only to 
situations where ‘a party failed to take reasonable steps to preserve’ [the] ESI 
[and] not to situations where, as here, a party intentionally deleted” the ESI at 
issue.88  Furthermore, the court referred to the Committee Notes in commenting 
that Rule 37 was amended “to address ‘the serious problems resulting from the 
continued exponential growth in the volume of ESI as well as “excessive effort 
and money” that litigants have had to expend to avoid potential sanctions for 
failure to preserve ESI.’”89  The court ruled that such “considerations [were] not 
applicable” because the issue was not that the plaintiff “had improper systems 
in place to prevent the loss of the recording,” but rather that the recording itself 
“no longer existed . . . because [the plaintiff] took specific action to delete it.”90 
                                                 
 85. Brown Jordan Int’l, Inc. v. Carmicle, Nos. 0:14-CV-60629, 0:14-CV-61415, 2016 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 25879, at *118 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 2. 2016), aff’d, 846 F.3d 1167 (11th Cir. 2017).  See 
also Schmalz, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 216011, at *14 (quoting Brown, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
25879, at *118). 
 86. Schmalz, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 216011, at *18. 
 87. Hsueh v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Fin. Servs., No. 15 Civ. 3401, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49568, 
at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2017). 
 88. Id. at *11. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
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After holding that Rule 37(e) was not applicable, the court relied on its 
inherent power to impose spoliation sanctions.91  Based on the spoliator’s 
inconsistent and unconvincing testimony as to why she deleted the relevant 
recordings, the court found that the spoliator “acted in bad faith in deleting the 
recording[,]” and thereby concluded that “[u]nder either Rule 37(e) and the 
Court’s inherent authority, an adverse inference is the appropriate remedy in 
light of the Court’s findings.”92  Such a conclusion seems to suggest that even if 
the court had applied the Rule, an adverse inference would have been 
appropriate; however, the purpose underlying the adoption of the new Rule 37(e) 
was to foreclose courts’ reliance on their inherent authority. 
In any event, the Hsueh court appears to have erred by rejecting application 
of Rule 37(e), as it did not have to determine whether the spoliator had acted in 
bad faith.  In other words, the court’s decision appears to suggest that a 
spoliator’s bad faith actions are sufficient to satisfy the “intent to deprive” 
culpability under Rule 37(e)(2).  Furthermore, this holding makes clear that the 
spoliator’s deletion of the recordings would have been sanctionable under either 
the inherent power of the court or Rule 37(e).  But, if the court was certain that 
Rule 37(e) should not apply to this case, then it should not have felt the need to 
address its application in the relief section of its decision, after rejecting its 
applicability in the prior discussion.93 
As demonstrated, courts have inconsistently relied on inherent authority—
explicitly or implicitly—as well as findings of bad faith, or lack thereof, in 
reaching conclusions on whether to impose sanctions for spoliation of relevant 
ESI.  While the adoption of Rule 37(e) was intended to achieve uniformity in 
case law for the imposition of spoliation sanctions, courts have not only failed 
to apply the Rule consistently, but at least one court has erroneously disregarded 
the application of the Rule.  Others have continued to rely on their inherent 
powers, thereby thwarting the underlying purpose of Rule 37(e), which was to 
foreclose reliance on inherent authority of the courts.94 
                                                 
 91. Id. at *11–12. 
 92. Id. at *16 (elaborating that the plaintiff “acted in bad faith, and with an intent to deprive 
[the defendant] of the use of the recording, in deleting it”). 
 93. Id.  If the court was correct that Rule 37(e) is not applicable here, then it was right to rely 
on its inherent authority and, therefore, to analyze whether the plaintiff acted in bad faith because 
such a finding is necessary to sanction under inherent authority.  That analysis itself should have 
been sufficient for the court to grant an adverse inference against the plaintiff. 
 94. See supra Sections II.B.1–2. 
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III.  A PROPOSAL FOR ACHIEVING UNIFORMITY OF CASE LAW IN COURTS’ 
IMPOSITION OF SEVERE SANCTIONS FOR SPOLIATION OF ESI UNDER RULE 
37(E)(2) 
A.  A Stringent “Intent to Deprive” Culpability Standard Must be Established 
First and foremost, a standard clearly defining the “intent to deprive” 
culpability required by Rule 37(e)(2) must be established in order to achieve 
uniformity of case law in courts’ imposition of severe sanctions for ESI 
spoliation.  Without a clear standard identifying what constitutes intent to 
deprive another party of the use of such evidence, courts will continue to treat 
similar misconduct differently, issuing sanctions that may not necessarily fit the 
misconduct or that undermine the underlying goals of sanctions. 
The intent to deprive culpability standard of Rule 37(e)(2) must be a 
heightened one that is difficult to satisfy: only upon a showing of intentional and 
willing act by the spoliator to destroy the relevant ESI, in addition to other fact(s) 
shedding light on the spoliator’s state of mind or motivation, should it be found 
that the spoliator intended to deprive another party of the use of such evidence 
at the time of the destruction.  In the rare case in which direct evidence of the 
spoliator’s state of mind at the time of spoliation is available—demonstrating 
that the intention was to deprive another party from using such evidence in 
litigation—additional factors shedding light on the spoliator’s intent would be 
unnecessary.  However, direct evidence manifesting one’s subjective intent is 
not always readily available, and, therefore, courts often rely on circumstantial 
evidence in order to infer whether the spoliator acted with such intent. 
Additional facts that may shed light on the spoliator’s state of mind may 
include, but certainly are not limited to, the following: facts showing the 
spoliator’s “double deletion” of relevant ESI by destroying or deleting the 
relevant ESI and then ordering and/or instructing others with access to the same 
ESI to destroy it.95  “Double deletion” can also be accomplished by somehow 
going a step further from the initial destruction—such as installing a certain 
program or software, thereby manifesting a motive to destroy the ESI, and/or 
having a selective data preservation system in place that evinces the kind of 
deliberate behavior the sanctions are designed to prevent.96 
                                                 
 95. See GN Netcom, Inc. v. Plantronics, Inc., No. CV-12-1318-LPS, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
93299, at *5, *25, *29 (D. Del. July 12, 2016).  Double-deletion may also “mean [an] operator 
hit[ting] the delete key both to move the email into the trash folder and then hit[ting] the delete key 
on the same email once in the trash folder.”  DVComm, LLC v. Hotwire Commc’n., LLC, No. CV-
14-5543, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13661, at *7 n.13 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 3, 2016). 
 96. See Resnik v. Coulson, 17-CV-676 (PKC) (SMG), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92159, at *40–
41 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2019) (“[D]efendent conceded before the state court that he was given advance 
notice that the sheriff would be coming to seize his devises. . . .  These facts support a strong 
inference that defendant acted intentionally, and with urgency, when he employed data-wiping 
software just one day after the seizure of his devices was ordered. Defendant, of course, offers no 
evidence indicating that any wiping of data that occurred was innocent or merely negligent or 
grossly negligent.”). 
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For instance, in First Financial Security, Inc. v. Freedom Equity Group, LLC, 
while the spoliator party argued that the deletion of pertinent text messages was 
an “innocent mistake[ ],” the court disagreed and concluded that the spoliator 
parties’ “agreement to avoid communicating electronically suggest[ed] a shared 
intent to keep incriminating facts out of evidence.”97  This court did not 
explicitly hold that such additional evidence, from which it inferred the shared 
intent among the spoliator parties, was necessary for the court’s conclusion that 
the spoliator parties acted with the intent to deprive another party of pertinent 
evidence.98  But, in establishing the heightened standard to satisfy the intent to 
deprive culpability, this sort of supporting evidence should be made explicitly 
necessary—in addition to the spoliator’s willful, intentional destruction of 
relevant ESI—before any court issues the severe sanctions available under Rule 
37(e)(2). 
In contrast, the court in Orchestrate HR, Inc. v. Trombetta declined to find an 
intent to deprive of the spoliator who had deleted relevant emails because 
according to the court, it was presented with “only equivocal evidence about [the 
spoliator’s] state of mind at the time that he deleted the emails.”99  The court was 
presented with the following evidence regarding the spoliator’s deletion of 
relevant emails: the spoliator admitted in his deposition “that he deleted [the] 
emails and he ‘may’ have done so to ‘cover his tracks[,]’”; however, in his later-
created declaration, he stated that he had deleted the emails “in the ordinary 
course of business only,” and those emails that he had admittedly forwarded to 
his personal email account were provided to the other party.100 
Based on this conflicting evidence, which the court itself found “troubling,” 
the court held that even with “equivocal testimony . . . [the plaintiffs] failed to 
show that [the spoliator] destroyed any emails in bad faith or with the requisite 
intent to deprive” the plaintiffs.101  While evidence established that the spoliator 
“was aware of potential litigation at the time that he deleted the emails and that 
he knew or should have known that emails on certain subjects . . . might be 
relevant to the litigation,” the court found that the requisite intent was not 
satisfied “[c]onsidering the totality of circumstances.”102 
However, if the stringent intent to deprive standard had been established and 
applied at the time of this court’s decision, the outcome under Rule 37(e)(2) may 
have differed because the spoliator intentionally deleted the emails at issue, 
despite his knowledge that there may be potential litigation and so the emails 
may be of relevance.  The “troubling” conflicting evidence regarding his state 
                                                 
 97. First Fin. Sec., Inc. v. Freedom Equity Grp., LLC, No. 15-CV-1893-HRL, 2016 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 140087, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2016). 
 98. Id. at *10–12. 
 99. Orchestrate HR, Inc. v. Trombetta, 178 F. Supp. 3d 476, 493 (N.D. Tex. 2016) (emphasis 
added). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 492–93. 
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of mind at the time of spoliation may have been sufficient circumstantial 
evidence—shedding light on his motivation to delete the emails—to support a 
finding of the intent to deprive required under Rule 37(e)(2).  As a result, the 
court may have been willing to hold that the spoliator’s conflicting testimony 
weighed in favor of a finding that he actually intended to deprive the plaintiffs 
of the use of the destroyed evidence. 
By requiring a showing of intent to actually deprive another party of the use 
of relevant ESI, which is not necessarily satisfied by an intent to perform an act 
that destroys the ESI, courts would properly reserve the more severe sanctions 
for egregious conduct done with a state of mind beyond negligence or gross 
negligence.  Such a heightened standard, making it more difficult to satisfy the 
culpability requirement under Rule 37(e)(2), is not only appropriate but 
necessary because adverse inferences and/or dismissals of actions are 
detrimental to the disputing parties, as allowing severe sanctions for 
unreasonable preservation of relevant ESI in, for example, the instance where a 
party passively allows destruction of relevant ESI, is unnecessarily harsh and 
drifts away from the underlying goal of deterrence towards pure punishment.  
Furthermore, although the Committee Notes are not rules themselves, they are 
intended to help all involved parties interpret and apply the Rules.  Thus, where 
the Committee Notes explicitly reject allowing severe sanctions based on 
negligence or gross negligence, this commentary should be taken seriously and 
not dismissed merely because it is not integrated into the text of the Rules. 
B.  There Should be No Room for Bad Faith Findings or Inherent Authority of 
Courts in Application of the Proposed Standard 
As discussed above, even where courts have explicitly recognized that the 
new Rule 37(e) is applicable under relevant circumstances, they have often 
relied on findings of bad faith to reach their ultimate decision to impose 
sanctions under Rule 37(e)(2), without any specific discussion or reasoning as 
to which facts led to such conclusions.103  Other courts have analyzed the same 
issue of imposition of sanctions for ESI spoliation based on findings of whether 
the spoliator acted in bad faith or with intent to deprive, which leads to a 
misconception that acting in bad faith and acting with intent to deprive are 
interchangeable standards.104 
                                                 
 103. See Brown Jordan Int’l, Inc. v. Carmicle, Nos. 0:14-CV-60629, 0:14-CV-61415, 2016 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25879, at *110–12 (S.D. Flo. Mar. 1, 2016), aff’d 846 F.3d 1167 (11th Cir. 2017). 
 104. Ala. Aircraft Indus., Inc. v. Boeing, Co., 319 F.R.D. 730, 744–47 (N.D. Ala. 2017) 
(finding the intent to deprive required under Rule 37(e)(2) and holding that permissive adverse 
inferences were warranted based on bad faith spoliation case law).  While the Eleventh Circuit 
spoliation elements overlap with those of Rule 37(e) to a certain degree, the court did not undergo 
any analysis of Rule 37(e) prerequisites.  Id.  See also Orchestrate HR, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 3d at 490, 
493 (stating that Rule 37(e) application was “just and practicable” under the circumstances, then 
relying upon a finding of either bad faith or intent to deprive, together, as if applying an either/or 
prong test and treating either as sufficient). 
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However, the proposed heightened standard, requiring a showing of intent to 
deprive, does not mean that a showing of bad faith is necessary or sufficient.  
Courts should not feel any need to determine whether the spoliator acted in bad 
faith or not because Rule 37(e) neither requires nor even mentions bad faith.  
Bad faith findings have long been part of courts’ spoliation analyses because 
courts have traditionally imposed sanctions pursuant to their inherent 
authority—for which the existence of bad faith was a prerequisite.  The Supreme 
Court has held of a court’s inherent power, “certain implied powers must 
necessarily result to our Courts of justice from the nature of their institution . . . 
which cannot be dispensed with in a Court, because they are necessary to the 
exercise of all others.”105  The Supreme Court also held that a federal court may 
exercise its inherent power to sanction, even if existing procedural rules address 
the same misconduct,106 a concept dissenting justices criticized heavily because 
they reasoned that it exempts courts from relying on express sanctioning 
provisions provided by Congress.107 
While there is no binding authority forbidding courts from resorting to their 
inherent power to sanction, courts should rely on the express sanctioning 
provisions, where applicable, in an effort to enhance consistency and 
predictability of resulting case law on ESI spoliation sanctions.  Furthermore, 
the Supreme Court has also held that “[b]ecause inherent powers are shielded 
from direct democratic controls, they must be exercised with restraint and 
discretion” to fashion an appropriate sanction for conduct which abuses the 
judicial process.108  Particularly with respect to sanctioning ESI spoliation, 
which Rule 37(e) was specifically adopted to address—and also taking into 
consideration the Committee Notes’ statement that the underlying intention of 
such adoption was to foreclose courts’ reliance on their inherent authority—
courts should, first and foremost, rely on Rule 37(e) in deciding whether to 
impose sanctions.  Consequently, courts should no longer resort to their inherent 
authority to sanction whether such reliance is made explicit or implicit in their 
decisions.109 
                                                 
 105. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991) (quoting United States v. Hudson, 11 
U.S. 32, 34 (1812)). 
 106. Id. at 50. 
 107. Id. at 61 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“With all respect, I submit the Court commits two 
fundamental errors.  First, it permits the exercise of inherent sanctioning powers without prior 
recourse to controlling Rules and statutes . . . .”). 
 108. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764–65 (1980). 
 109. Because bad faith and inherent authority are not found anywhere in the text of Rule 37(e), 
bad faith analysis should not be necessary or sufficient to answer the question of whether the 
spoliator party had acted with “an intent to deprive another party of the [relevant ESI] in litigation.”  
See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e)(2).  Nevertheless, in a case where a court is compelled to analyze bad 
faith in its discussion, it should make the reasons for such analysis abundantly clear, as well as the 
nexus between its finding of bad faith (or lack thereof) and its ultimate finding of intent to deprive 
under Rule 37(e)(2).  By providing clear explanations as to the impact of the bad faith finding on 
the ultimate imposition of sanctions under Rule 37(e)(2), any ambiguity as to the court’s reliance 
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C.  The Permissive Language of Rule 37(e), Allowing Discretionary Sanctions, 
Should be Removed 
A critical view of the new Rule 37(e) contends that it fails to resolve any 
uncertainty among the district courts in sanctioning spoliation because the 
“permissive nature” of Rule 37(e) undermines the original purpose of sanctions, 
while increasing the unpredictability of courts’ decisions on imposition of 
sanctions “because parties do not know when, if ever, an adverse inference 
instruction will be imposed even after a finding” that the non-spoliator party 
sufficiently demonstrated the requirements of Rule 37(e)(2).110  Critics argue 
that because Rule 37(e) allows courts to exercise their discretion in its use of the 
word “may,” rather than “must” or “shall,” the predictability of outcomes on the 
question of actual imposition of sanctions remains uncertain.111 
Furthermore, should a court decide that an adverse inference jury instruction 
is the appropriate sanction, judges enjoy “substantial flexibility” in drafting the 
actual language of the instruction.112  Thus, the charge to the jury may vary 
significantly, depending on the circumstances, which may also lead to diverging 
outcomes in different courts.113  Therefore, it is contended that merely permitting 
imposition of sanctions, rather than mandating them under Rule 37(e), takes 
away the authoritative sanctioning power that the Rule once had.114 
Advocates of mandatory jury instructions have argued that “[b]ecause a 
central purpose of an evidentiary rule is to provide guidance and consistency, 
the [jury] instruction should be mandatory instead of discretionary” because the 
optional nature of the Rule would thwart its effectiveness.115  If sanctions were 
mandatory, they would be issued as long as the prerequisites were satisfied, 
making the Rule more effective in deterring spoliation and establishing uniform 
case law.  Hence, it may be argued that even if courts adopted and consistently 
applied the proposed standard of intent to deprive, and thereby treated similar 
                                                 
on bad faith would be reduced.  As a result, the validity of sanctions following courts’ well-reasoned 
conclusions would not be subject to questions. 
 110. Alexandra Marie Reynolds, Note, Spoliating the Adverse Inference Instruction: The 
Impact of the 2015 Amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e), 51 GA. L. REV. 917, 935 
(2017). 
 111. See id. at 931 (“Judge Scheindlin went on to predict that if the rule only dictated that a 
judge ‘may’ impose the permissive adverse inference instruction upon a showing of all requisite 
elements, ‘the optional nature of the rule would gut its effectiveness.’”). 
 112. Hon. Shira A. Scheindlin & Natalie M. Orr, The Adverse Inference Instruction After 
Revised Rule 37(e): An Evidence-Based Proposal, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 1299, 1303 (2014). 
 113. See id. (“Even the permissive inference can take multiple forms, prompting one 
commentator to opine that ‘nearly fifty shades of adverse inference instructions have emerged.’  
Some courts inform the jury that spoliation has occurred but allow the jury to infer the likely 
contents of the evidence and decide what weight to accord that inference.  Others allow the jury to 
determine whether spoliation has occurred in the first place.”). 
 114. Reynolds, supra note 111, at 942. 
 115. Scheindlin & Orr, supra note 113, at 1313. 
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spoliation conduct similarly, the permissive nature of Rule 37(e) sanctions 
would still produce inconsistent results. 
However, courts enjoy substantial discretion in choosing the appropriate 
remedy for spoliation, and sanctioning power is also properly within that 
discretion.116  Courts are in the best position to exercise discretion to impose 
severe sanctions—upon satisfying the proposed strict standard of Rule 37(e)(2) 
because they have access to the evidence, and are able to make appropriate 
judgments based on that evidence.  Additionally, the Rule’s text clearly provides 
for courts’ discretion in the imposition of sanctions by using the word “may,” 
instead of “should” or “shall.”117  Unless and until the Rule is revised to 
explicitly remove such discretion, courts’ discretionary conclusions should be 
respected.  As discussed above, courts’ consistent application of the proposed 
heightened standard for the intent to deprive would result in more consistent and 
uniform case law. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Although a primary goal underlying the adoption of the new Rule 37(e) in 
2015 was to resolve the circuit split and promote uniformity of case law on ESI 
spoliation sanctions, an examination of relevant case law under the new Rule 
37(e) has revealed that courts treat similar spoliation conduct differently due to 
the lack of a clear standard for finding the spoliator’s intent to deprive another 
party of the use of the destroyed ESI at issue.  Such inconsistency was 
exacerbated by the courts’ inconsistent reliance on their inherent authority to 
sanction based on a bad faith analysis. 
This Article proposes establishing a clear and strict standard for courts across 
the nation to apply in determining whether the spoliator acted with the intent to 
deprive another party of the use of the relevant ESI under Rule 37(e)(2).  Such 
a standard requires demonstration of the spoliator’s willful, intentional act that 
destroyed the relevant ESI in addition to supporting evidence that sheds light on 
the spoliator’s actual state of mind and intent to deprive another party of the use 
of the destroyed ESI in litigation.  In courts’ determination of whether the non-
spoliator sufficiently showed the spoliator’s intent under Rule 37(e)(2), based 
on the proposed standard, neither courts’ inherent authority to sanction nor 
findings of bad faith should have bearing.  Once courts begin to exclusively 
apply the proposed heightened standard for Rule 37(e)(2), and no longer rely on 
their inherent authority or bad faith findings, the inconsistency in case law that 
has resulted from courts’ reliance on inherent authority and bad faith analyses to 
date will no longer result. 
                                                 
 116. See Fujitsu Ltd. v. Fed. Express Corp., 247 F.3d 423, 436 (3d Cir. 2001) (“The 
determination of an appropriate sanction for spoliation, if any, is confined to the sound discretion 
of the trial judge and is assessed on a case-by-case basis.”) (citation omitted). 
 117. FED. R. CIV. P. 32(e)(2). 
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Because courts should exercise caution in the imposition of severe sanctions 
under Rule 37(e)(2), such as adverse inference presumptions, it is reasonable 
and proper to heighten the standard to satisfy the requisite level of culpability.  
This would ensure that courts consistently impose severe sanctions only for 
egregious spoliation conduct which warrants such sanctions.  This is why courts 
should no longer impose Rule 37(e)(2) sanctions for merely negligent or grossly 
negligent destruction of ESI.  Less severe measures to redress ESI spoliation, 
resulting from a party’s mere failure to take reasonable steps to preserve the ESI, 
should be imposed pursuant to Rule 37(e)(1).  Only upon satisfaction of the 
proposed stringent culpability standard should the severe sanctions under Rule 
37(e)(2) be granted.  Furthermore, despite the discretionary nature of sanctions, 
due to the permissive language in Rule 37(e), as courts begin to consistently 
apply the proposed stringent culpability standard for severe sanctions, the 
resulting decisions will be far more consistent—and, therefore, significantly 
closer to achieving uniformity in case law on ESI spoliation sanctions. 
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